the modest discussion of the same issue in Dan Horowitz's contribution.
And he concludes, quite fittingly, with a discussion of the degree to which
a strategy of opacity is compatible with democracy. By following this path
Cohen adds an important dimension to this volume, while carrying the
fundamental dilemma with which all other contributors wrestle to its most
acute and intractable conclusion.

Notes

1. Cf. Amnon Rubinstein, *From Herzl to Gush Emunim and Back* (Jerusa-
lem: Schocken, 1980); Dina Goren, *Secrecy, Security, and Freedom of the Press*
(Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1976); Moshe Lissak, ed., *Israeli Society and Its Defense
Establishment* (London: Frank Cass, 1984); Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak,
"Democracy and National Security: An Ongoing Confrontation," *Yahadut*
*of Israel* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989); Itzhak Zamir,
"A Barrel Without Hoops: The Impact of Counterterrorism on Israel's Legal
Culture," *Cardozo Law Review*, 10 (December 1988): 529–559; Moshe Negbi,
*Above the Law* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1980); Mordechai Kremnitzer, "General
Security Services Pardon: A Test for the High Court of Justice," *Tel Aviv Uni-
(Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Poojin, 1986); Alan Dowty, "The Use of Emergency Powers
in Wartime: Conflict and Consensus in Israel* (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Poojin, 1992);
Menahem Hofnung, *Israel—Security Needs vs. the Rule of Law* (Nevo: Jerusalem,
speeches and writings of David Ben-Gurion, Yigal Allon, Moshe Dayan, and Shimon Peres, among others. Paradoxically, their approach was consistent with Arab legalistic positions that were, in turn, unacceptable to Israeli jurists: that the state of war between Israel and the Arab states is never suspended, even after an armistice or cease-fire agreements.

This discrepancy between legal claims and operative presumptions is but one expression of the Realpolitik of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is perceived by both sides as a “given.” For the decisionmakers, diplomacy, including its legal aspect, is a tool for the political management of a conflict, a management based on strategic considerations. Ben-Gurion articulated this view in 1955 when he described the institutional relationship between the Foreign and Defense ministries: “The Minister of Defense is authorized to make defense policy; the role of the Foreign Minister is to explain that policy.”

This orientation betrays a propensity to take risks: ensuring that military capabilities are adequate to the conflict is considered more important than actual attempts to resolve it. Confining the conflict’s dimensions or reducing its intensity are “probable risks” in operative terms. Meanwhile, any threats to even marginal aspects of military security are perceived as “essential risks,” acute threats to actual existence. This is the source of Israel’s extreme caution vis-à-vis such initiatives as withdrawal from the Suez Canal in order to reopen it to navigation (in 1971) or on the “Jericho Plan,” which followed in 1974. Even the political and military aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, including Sadat’s peace initiative and the peace treaty with Egypt, only effected a partial revision of this orientation. Political considerations still could not be divorced from meeting security considerations: One of the legacies of the Yom Kippur War was increased Israeli dependence on the United States for both its military power and its international standing.

Perceived as a given in the operational context, the conflict is considered in an ideological context to be imposed upon Israel. The national consensus feeds off the presumption that Israel is on the political and strategic defensive in any given operation, even when the army assumes that operation is offensive. This perception is attached to the asymmetry of the conflict: The Arabs can translate military and operative superiority into a strategic victory—they can resolve the conflict by annihilating Israel. Israel, on the other hand, cannot resolve the conflict militarily—as a result, it has no clearly defined war aims.

In fact, the only basis of national consensus in Israel is that there is a need to cope with the threat to its existence, and that this can be done only by means of the country’s own armed might. In war this aim was translated into the operational goal of destroying enemy forces in order to deny them an offensive capability. Israelis were far less unanimous about territorial aims. One popular view maintained that territory captured while staving off a threat to security was actually a retroactive realization of a “historic right” to Biblical Israel. Others saw the captured territory as a “bargaining chip.” In any event, most Israeli policy before 1977 conceived of territory—excepting Jerusalem—as integral to answering threats against Israel’s existence and improving its security situation, whether this was in terms of “security borders,” “defensible borders,” or as territory exchangeable for political and military agreements (all within the context of the Israeli principle of defensive self-reliance).

Moreover, even among adherents of a “Greater Israel” who favor expansion of Israel’s borders, many base their territorial claims on the essential security function of those territories captured in 1967 rather than on any historic rights to the land. Thus, we found ourselves learning that in the Israeli conception of security it was the defense of the country that determined Israeli war aims. Challenges to this orientation were voiced from time to time by sections of the security and political establishment, but they were rejected by the makers of defense policy, both throughout the era preceding Likud’s ascension to power and during the period of the first Likud government, of which Ezer Weizman, Moshe Dayan, and Yigal Yadin were all members. Only in 1982 were there indications that a different conception had emerged, envisioning the use of Israeli military force for more than deterring and meeting threats. This new concept of Israeli security rejected the “denial” approach to national security, an approach that implied controlled use of military power in the context of “defensive” political and strategic aims, applicable to both “low intensity warfare” and full-scale military confrontation.

The existence of such terms as “low intensity warfare” or “dormant war” indicates the absence of a clear boundary between a state of war and one of peace. Conditions of neither war nor peace in the form of a “cease-fire,” “armistice,” or “separation of forces,” periodically interrupted by full-scale military conflict, mold the Israeli conception of the role of violence in the international arena. In this context, the use of military force in periods when no full-scale hostilities are taking place or in the context of a limited war is integral to the Israeli concept of a controlled use of force in an ongoing conflict. The noncontinuous employment of military force at various degrees of intensity has enabled Israel to pursue a flexible strategy based on its military might, even when that might is not fully engaged. In conditions of “dormant war” Israel has considered itself free to execute preventive military measures designed to thwart the enemy’s offensive capability, even if offensive intentions could not be proven. An outstanding example of Israel’s need to approach this situation on a “worst-case” basis is its 1981 attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor.

Rejection of the dichotomy between conditions of war and peace,
together with a policy of controlled use of military force, are characteristic of the "strategic studies school" in international politics. The school of strategic studies that developed in the United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s assumed, as did Clausewitz, that "war is the continuation of diplomacy, but by other means." Clausewitz's emphasis on the political dimension of military action was here enhanced by a new vision of conflict management by the indirect use of military force. Limited war, on one hand, or the use of threats issuing from real or apparent military capabilities in the form of "deterrence" or "compellence," on the other hand, were viewed as two prongs of the controlled employment of force. This approach, based on a continual application of force at differing degrees of severity, led to the development of the concept of controlled escalation as a means of managing international conflicts.

The Israeli version of these concepts was in use about a decade before the school of strategic studies took shape in the United States. It coalesced, through trial and error, as part of the search for an answer to the dilemma of being unable to effect either a diplomatic or a military resolution of a conflict. The emergence of this approach in Israel is noteworthy because it was out of a similar situation of assumed conflict with no possibility of victory for either side (due to mutually assured nuclear destruction) that the school of strategic studies developed in the United States. The strategic approach to international relations now became connected on both the level of "conflict orientation," which prioritizes national security needs, and on the level of controlled application by force to the conditions of an ongoing conflict, whose resolution by political or military means was considered unlikely but which still constituted a great threat.

Thus there are striking similarities between strategic approaches that developed under completely different historical, geopolitical, and military/technological circumstances, whether in an ideological/political conflict between superpowers armed with nuclear weapons, or a regional political/territorial conflict between small nations, conventionally armed, who may or may not have potential nuclear capacity. The perception of the threat, which for years spurred coalescence of a broad national consensus in Israel on questions of security, did not stem only from a recognition of the seriousness of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the unlikelihood of its resolution; it was also influenced by the imbalance of forces between the two sides and by the disputed borders, which so acutely narrowed the Israeli margin of security. Thus Israel's security estimations reflect a strategic orientation whose starting point is the search for a solution to two fundamental problems: the problem of the balance of forces and the problem of strategic depth.

This dual challenge, of both significant Arab advantage in resources, particularly in manpower, and borders difficult to defend because of their length and proximity to population centers, had no ready answer. Israeli military survival in such circumstances was enabled by creating a military force that efficiently exploited available resources and was guided by a military philosophy of bringing the war to the enemy's territory, a philosophy that was replaced after the Six Day War by the concept of the "defensible border." \(^{14}\)

"Quality Versus Quantity"

The equation of "quality versus quantity" recurs continuously in Israeli perceptions of the problem of the balance of forces. A careful examination of the concept of "quality" in Israeli security thinking shows that it usually means using available resources more efficiently than the enemy. In a more direct operative fashion, "quality" in one context appears as "quantity" in another. Input considered qualitative becomes output measured quantitatively: a more developed society, having undergone a process of modernization, is able to put a higher percentage of its population under arms during times of war; its more developed service infrastructure makes it possible for the same number of aircraft to fly a greater number of sorties in a day; armies with greater mobility are able to concentrate their strength where the battle will be decided; more precisely aimed tanks achieve a greater percentage of hits from the same number of shots. The cumulative effect of these advantages is what is meant by "quality versus quantity" in Israeli security thinking.\(^{15}\)

The factors contributing to "qualitative advantage" are varied: mobilization of manpower, mobilization of financial resources, levels of technology, professional training, organizational efficiency, and operative flexibility on the battlefield. The most outstanding example of an optimal exploitation of human resources in support of "the qualitative advantage" is the Israeli system of military reserves, which significantly reduces the implications of the population imbalance between Israel and the Arab countries. This system is enhanced by the superior mobilization capabilities of a small, developed society as opposed to large, less-developed ones. Israel's military preparedness rests on a "three-tiered structure: a professional army which serves as the command and professional backbone, a fully trained conscription army prepared for immediate action, and a reserve force available for deployment which also comprises the bulk of the armed forces in times of emergency." \(^{16}\)

The Israeli pattern of existence as a "nation in arms" or a "nation in uniform" is expressed by more than just this exploitation of its manpower potential for military purposes. The integration of quasimilitia elements (namely the reserves) in a modern and sophisticated military organization
is another element of the Israeli military posture. The reserves comprise the majority of the armored and artillery corps; air force reservists fly the most sophisticated combat aircraft; reserve officers command divisions. To obtain maximum realization of this manpower mobilization potential, financial resources for equipping, arming, and maintaining the expanded army are also required.

As a small country whose armed forces are on the order of a mid-sized world power, Israel's security demands in times of peace consume a larger percentage of the country's GNP than those of any other nation in the world. In the years following the 1973 War, Israel channeled more than a third of its GNP to defense. This level subsequently dropped to a little more than 25 percent. The most expensive component of Israeli military might is the air force, which keeps itself at the forefront of technological sophistication and purchases the most advanced combat aircraft available in order to maintain air superiority. An effective comparison of the extent of Israel's armament efforts can be made in the context of its armored divisions: if China were to maintain the same ratio of population size to armored corps as Israel, it would have about a million tanks.

The most important element of Israeli qualitative superiority over the Arab states is Israel's technological edge. Air superiority is but one example of Israeli efforts to counter the quantitative imbalance of forces by means of technologically superior weapons. For instance, a missile boat more sophisticated than any found in Arab arsenals was developed for use by the Israeli navy. It was then armed with missiles designed specifically by Israel for that craft. On the ground, Israeli quantitative inferiority in artillery pieces had been especially pronounced in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In attempting to compensate for this situation, mobile artillery units were created, made possible by the procurement of mobile guns not then present in either the Egyptian or Syrian arsenals. Furthermore, the Israeli plan to acquire qualitative technological weapons superiority meant ceaseless efforts to improve existing systems and to adapt them to actual fighting conditions.

Yet Israel did not fully exploit the technological possibilities for superiority. The limited resources of a "poor nation" prevented the Israeli army from being turned into the equivalent of a "capital-intensive" enterprise, which in military/technological terms means precise and efficient firepower. Economic realities, then, meant that technology could not be used to completely replace "quantity" with "quality." Nevertheless, Israeli superiority in integrating new technologies was seen as a security asset because professional training made possible the optimal use of those weapons. Air combat between Israelis and Arabs demonstrated, among other factors, the superior training of Israeli pilots, effected by a strict selection process and an especially high level of pilot training. The selectiveness in choosing personnel for elite units and a generally high level of professional training became the norm for all Israeli technical units. The armored brigades, for instance, emphasized improved tank marksmanship as a means for improving weapons efficiency.

High levels of professional training for each combat soldier mean the optimal operation of weapons systems; for support troops this translates into the optimal servicing of those systems. In this regard, a developed, well-educated society has an advantage over less-developed, less-educated societies. For instance, in order to increase the comparative number of sorties flown by Israeli jets, the level of training of Israeli air force ground crews was pushed to the limit. The training of technical maintenance units in the armored divisions enabled damaged vehicles to be quickly reintroduced into battle. Organizational efficiency has a similarly positive influence on improving the input/output ratio, although this aspect of quality in the Israeli military has been emphasized less. The Israeli military ethos led to the concentration of higher-quality manpower in combat roles rather than in support positions, especially within the officer corps.

Another ingredient of Israeli quality, and a crucial element in Israel's fighting ability, can be called operative flexibility in battle. This term is difficult to define without falling into ambiguities; it is even harder to express in quantitative terms. Operative flexibility in battle refers to those elements that influence the effective operations of forces on the battlefield. Such elusive characterizations as the "art of command" or "morale in the ranks" refer to some of these elements. Military doctrines reflected in combat principles and in systems of command, control, and communications are yet another kind of factor. While the balance of forces in personnel, equipment, and armaments is measurable, and while even apparently quantitative comparisons in the balance of forces—for instance, in weapons operations and training—can find quantitative expression in the precision and mobility of firepower, none of these factors can account for the reactions of the respective sides to changing conditions; and unpredictable flexibility in battle can be the decisive element for success in a military confrontation.

The conditions of unpredictability in battle originating in the fact that the outcome of any given battle depends on the actions and reactions of both sides, including deliberate deception and disinformation, make operative flexibility the means of economizing on the use of manpower and equipment during combat. A flexible use of forces facilitates their economical use because it obviates the predeployment of troops for all possible battle scenarios.

The most elusive factor determining flexibility of response in battle is
the "art of command." This factor is usually dependent on clearly fortuitous elements, such as an educated guess as to the enemy's next move. A more easily defined, if not exactly measurable, influence on flexible and quick response under the unpredictable conditions of battle—sometimes referred to as the "fog of war"—is the quality of the command, control, and communications structure of the respective sides.

Israeli superiority in this sphere is the product of a combination of social factors and military conceptions. The flexible response of command, control, and communications systems in the "fog of war" depends on the training, initiative, and devotion to duty of the personnel manning those systems. The need for a pool of adequately educated and motivated personnel favors a modern, unified society, and handicaps societies that are both less modern and less unified.

The full exploitation of this advantage, which is born of social factors, depends on adopting military concepts and actions conducive to the flexible operation of command, control, and communications. Such military thinking encouraging initiative, resourcefulness, and even improvisation at all levels of command did not develop in Israel as a clearly conceived military doctrine. Like other aspects of building a military organization, the conceptual legitimacy of methods proven effective and suitable to Israeli military conflict was granted only after the fact. The roots of the Israeli military tradition can be found in the irregular, underground fighting force baptism by fire in the War of Independence and the reprisal policy of the 1950s, conflicts that were neither guerrilla actions nor full-scale war. The conditions in which these conflicts arose prevented creation of any organizational or conceptual infrastructure before the commencement of combat. This fact has continued to shape the operative methods of the command, control, and communications structure of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) even after it became a technologically advanced army equipped with the finest of modern armaments. The maxim stressed in the IDF is adherence to the objective (rather than to the plan). This guides all modes of command, control, and communications in the IDF.8

These operative methods addressed two central dilemmas: planning versus improvisation and control versus resourcefulness. The answer to the former was that "every plan is a basis for revision." Adherence to the objective supersedes adherence to a specific plan if it should go awry in the confusion of battle. The answer to the second dilemma was a decentralization of authority in order to allow the relatively lower ranks of command, those physically engaged in the fighting, to respond quickly to the changing configuration of the battlefield without having to request security authorization. This meant devotion to the mission even in the absence of direct orders, but it did not excuse the commander in the field from reporting to his superiors, who retained "optional control."

A flexible system of command, control, and communications does not just economize on forces; it also tends to be less vulnerable than a more strictly structured system to the pressures of battle. It is not as susceptible to surprise and deception by the enemy, a distinct advantage in the "fog of war." A highly mobile, offensive strategy places great stress on the command, control, and communications systems of both sides, but is more debilitating for less flexible structures. This relative immunity from collapse in battle, while influencing the outcome of military confrontation, is difficult to measure when comparing the balance of forces. The starting point for Moshe Dayan's planning of the Sinai campaign of 1956 was a calculation of the chances for disintegration of the enemy's fighting structure.

Dayan's colleagues in the IDF General Staff were vehemently critical of that approach. In the Six Day War, the collapse of the command, control, and communications structure of the Egyptian army contributed significantly to Israel's quick victory, but in the Yom Kippur War similar expectations of an Egyptian collapse in the face of the Israeli counterattack of October 8 did not prove realistic. Even after Israeli forces crossed the Suez Canal, the Egyptian structure did not, for the most part, break down. Thus the Israeli advantage, rooted in the different thresholds of disintegration of the respective Israeli and Arab military structures, has led to Israeli preference for a mobile and offensive war over a static and defensive one. This, however, is not sufficient to secure success, nor is it a reason to undertake high risks in war.

The Israeli security conception of quality versus quantity usually refers to the balance of conventional forces. The development of an Israeli nuclear capability has been defined as an "option." Because it was not an element in the current balance of forces, but was intended as the linchpin of a future Israeli nuclear strategy if Israel found it impossible to maintain a balance of conventional forces, or if Arab nuclear capability became a reality, open advocacy of an Israeli nuclear strategy emerged only after the Yom Kippur War and was aimed at mitigating the economic burden of maintaining the balance of conventional forces. In spite of this advocacy, however, the school of conventional superiority continued to dominate Israeli security thinking, refusing to take into account the threat of a "bomb in the basement" in the course of operative military planning.19

Depth, Preemption, and Defensible Borders

The Israeli search for an answer to the quantitative imbalance of forces with the Arabs has been guided by an instrumental military/security
orientation. Moral principles, ideological polemic, and nonstrategic considerations have been deemed irrelevant to the problem, and thus extraordinary solutions, such as the reserves system and the mass allocation of resources to security needs, have become a part of the national consensus. This consensus on security matters, made possible by the autonomous status accorded to the "instrumental strategic considerations," was not indifferent to the risks associated with the absence of strategic depth. Although presentations of the problem, in both closed and public forums, often emphasized an instrumental strategic perspective, the public debate in Israel revolved around the relationship between strategic conceptions of territory and one's own views of Zionism, the "Land of Israel," and Jewish-Arab relations. This was true even of former soldiers. Thus, even if instrumental/strategic considerations were not a direct outgrowth of ideological considerations, a connection between the two clearly existed.

The problem of strategic depth has two aspects: On one hand, it is a problem of the limited area available for the offensive maneuverability of Israeli forces during war. This limitation is born of the proximity of Israel's vital centers to the pre-1967 borders and severely affects Israel's ability to initially withstand an enemy strike and only afterwards move onto a counterattack. Any tactical retreat is liable to develop into a strategic threat. On the other hand, the problem of strategic depth is related to the Israeli solution to the quantitative imbalance in forces. As such, the problem of space becomes a problem of time. Israeli preparedness for war depends on the military reserves, and the narrow pre-1967 borders meant that a surprise attack before the reserves could be mobilized would ensure an enemy victory. The popular cliché of Israel's "soft underbelly," the country's central region lying between the "Green Line" and the sea, had real meaning.

The Israeli answer to this absence of strategic depth was formulated by Ben-Gurion, who in 1948 adopted the concept of "bringing the war to the enemy." The operative significance of this solution was assumption of an offensive posture in any military confrontation with the Arab states. Only one question remained: How would such an offensive strategy actually be carried out by an army consisting primarily of reserve units? The answer in the early 1950s was for the most part technical: intelligence warnings of enemy intentions, early mobilization, and absorption by regional defense units of an enemy first strike if forewarning of an attack was late in coming. Later, with the increased tendency to apply offensive strategy to the opening stages of war, these answers proved inadequate. Yigal Allon called this extension of the offensive posture to the actual outbreak of fighting a "preemptive strike." The IDF adopted the doctrine of preemptive strike in the mid-1950s, during Moshe Dayan's tenure as chief of staff, and it continued to guide Israeli military planners through the Six Day War. Theoretically the army filled its obligation to provide the political echelon with the option of absorbing an enemy first strike. But in reality the army was optimally designed to wage a war initiated by Israel. The outstanding example of this fact was the air force's plan in the 1960s to destroy enemy planes on the ground by means of a surprise strike, instead of acquiring an advantage in the air by means of a superior ability to down enemy aircraft in combat. The difference in terms of risks and estimation of casualties in initiating a war rather than withstanding an enemy first strike and then launching a counteroffensive played a crucial role in the decision reached in 1967 following the period of crisis that preceded the June war. Once Egyptian forces massed among the Israel-Sinai border, the Israeli political leadership found itself under pressure from the military to preempt the situation: to initiate a war in order to deny the Egyptians a first strike. This is how the IDF's offensive strategy, its answer to the problem of strategic depth, acted as a constraint on the political discretion of civilian decisionmakers.

It was made clear to the Eshkol government that the chances of a quick decision on the battlefield in a war with Egypt, one which could end with an acceptable level of losses, were much better if the IDF would be allowed to strike first and as soon as possible, before the Egyptians could be deployed in their new positions. The conclusions drawn from what unfolded during the crisis of May 1967 were to have a profound effect on Israeli defense thinking after the war: in many ways, the conception of defensible borders as an answer to the strategic-depth problem was the result of the traumatic waiting period preceding the Six Day War. That trauma revealed another Achilles heel in the security conception that prevailed from 1956 to 1967. After Israel became in essence a "status quo" nation, abandoning "peacetime military operations" (as Moshe Dayan called the policy of reprisals prior to the Sinai campaign), it chose a strategy of deterrence based on conventional force. The success of this strategy depended not only on actual Israeli might but on Arab foundations, and Israel was in need of an alternative in the event of its failure. Yitzhak Rabin articulated that alternative: "If deterrence fails, the IDF's ability to force a decision will be put to the test." This formula sought to bridge the two elements of Israeli strategic thinking, but it did not resolve the operational need to define what would be a failure of deterrence. How could Israel discern when its deterrence had failed and the time had come for a preemptive strike? The notion of predetermined "trip wires" in the form of casus belli that could include an attack on key Israeli interests during peacetime provided a partial answer.

A blockade of the Straits of Tiran was publicly known to be such a casus belli. Another declared casus belli, whose exact dimensions, how-
ever, were left unspecified, was any deterioration of the status quo in Jordan. Other potential provocations, which were less explicitly defined, included a concentration of Egyptian forces along the border with Israel. This last casus belli was linked to the de facto status of the Sinai as a buffer zone between the main Israeli and Egyptian forces. That status was established in the wake of the Israeli-Egyptian tensions in 1960, which instigated the Israeli "Operation Rotem": the Egyptians had responded to an Israeli reprisal raid on the Syrian border by moving substantial numbers of troops into the Sinai; Israel reacted with a partial mobilization. Tensions eased only after international mediation achieved an Egyptian withdrawal and Israeli demobilization.28

The understanding that made this type of solution possible was not anchored in any explicit declarations but in inferences, and it turned the Sinai into a kind of demilitarized zone where any concentration of Egyptian forces in the eastern half of the peninsula was sufficient provocation for Israeli mobilization and even war, if the situation was not reversed. There were other possible "trip wires" for war, if responses "short of war" were not effective in defusing them. These included denying Israel access to its water sources and the renewal of terrorist infiltration on any significant scale. These provocations supplied the link connecting qualified reliance on deterrence to a first strike, if deterrence failed and Israel was faced with a serious threat to its national security.

These "trip wires"—both explicit and inferred ones—were more than just warning signals that deterrence was failing, however. Their very existence, grown out of the need to maintain a credible deterrence based on conventional military superiority, created an additional potential provocation for war.29 If Israel left a provocation unanswered, it would be not only a signal to Israelis, but an indication to the Arabs that Israel lacked either the desire or the ability to back up its deterrence.29 Therefore, even if a strike at a vital interest defined as a casus belli was not in itself sufficient cause for war, it was enough reason for a military response, if only to prevent additional strikes at other vital interests. The U.S. school of strategic studies terms this the "domino effect," resulting when the credibility of deterrence comes into question.

Throughout May 1967 those vital Israeli interests that had been defined as casus belli were targeted, one after the other: the Egyptian army massed its forces in the eastern part of the Sinai, the Straits of Tiran were blockaded, and the status quo in Jordan was altered with the appointment of a joint Egyptian-Jordanian command and movement of Jordanian armor into the West Bank in violation of a U.S.-Jordanian understanding. Israel was confronted with the choice between having its strategic position challenged and initiating a war before a conducive international political climate could be created for such a step. This set of choices was what made the lessons of the prewar crisis so traumatic and strengthened the subsequent inclination to create a "capability of attack."

The outcome of the Six Day War endowed Israel with "strategic depth" for the first time in its history.27 The cease-fire lines of 1967 were much farther from the country's vital centers than the 1949 armistice lines had been, and the occupation of the Sinai provided a warning buffer from attack originating from Egyptian airfields. These changes paved the way for modification of the Israeli conception of the preemptive strike, which, although still viewed as militarily desirable, was no longer essential. The cease-fire lines were thought to provide Israel with the capability of absorbing an attack before having to move onto the offensive. The lessons of May 1967, along with control over the territories supplying strategic depth, contributed to adoption of a new conception of the territorial element in the Israeli security system.28 At first this concept was termed "secure borders," later "defensible borders." Abba Eban defined its strategic significance: "borders which can be defended without a pre-emptive initiative."33

The concept of secure borders had clear advantages over the preemptive strike as an answer to the Israeli problem of strategic depth. It freed Israel from the politically difficult task of initiating war and risking consequent accusations of aggression; it paved the way to a deterrence strategy whose efficacy was not dependent on "trip wires"; it mitigated the Arab temptation to attack in the hope of achieving victory before Israel could fully mobilize its reserves.

But just as the circumstances leading to the outbreak of the Six Day War exposed the limitations of the concepts of preemptive strike and casus belli, the circumstances leading to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War revealed the drawbacks of the concept of defensible borders and absorption of an enemy first strike. The forward IDF positions facing the brunt of the Egyptian forces in October 1973 were too thin and distant to hold out until the arrival of the reserves. In addition, neither the obstacle of the Suez Canal nor the Israeli air force's superiority could hold the Bar-Lev line once the Egyptians, whose primary aim was to overthrow the political status quo, were prepared to make do with a limited military and territorial victory. The Egyptians could achieve such a limited goal by crossing the canal with infantry not necessarily where Israeli fortifications dominated the axes leading to the canal, and by not advancing beyond the range of their antiaircraft defenses positioned on the canal's western side. Thus the Egyptians were poised to meet the Israeli counterattack with a dense infantry deployment equipped with antitank weapons and protected by an antiaircraft missile umbrella. Their position, with the canal at their backs, also denied Israeli armor any maneuverability once the Israelis did succeed in piercing a hole in Egyptian positions.34
Furthermore, political conditions and considerations of morale kept Israel from making operative use of its strategic depth by tactically retreating from the Bar-Lev line in the early stages of the war. On the Egyptian front the achievement of strategic depth meant Israel had forfeited the advantage of short supply lines. Thus strategic depth could not even be exploited because the IDF found it difficult to make the transition to counterattack after withstanding the first strike. And in the end, when the IDF succeeded in crossing the canal, theirs was a limited success, exacting a heavy price in casualties.

In contrast, the slight extra depth Israel acquired on the Golan Heights after the Six Day War made it possible to stop the Syrian armor before it took control of the entire Golan during the Yom Kippur War. Without this depth, a Syrian first strike would have reached the Israeli civilian settlements in the Hula and Jordan valleys.

The Yom Kippur War made it possible to take a more balanced look at the advantages and disadvantages of the concept of “defensible borders.” The war’s lessons showed that, along with its benefits, added strategic depth also brought a price. The belief that there was a single, unequivocal solution to the problem of strategic depth was disproved, and discussion about the territorial element of Israeli national security was consequently reopened. That discussion was a fertile one, both within the establishment and in the wider public, and it bred a range of alternatives, the most outstanding being the concept of demilitarized or partially demilitarized buffer zones. The military arrangements of the September 1975 (Sinni II) Egyptian-Israeli separation-of-forces agreement was based on this concept, as was the peace treaty with Egypt four years later.

The exchange of strategic depth behind Israeli lines for a demilitarized warning buffer in front of its lines made it possible for Israel to withdraw its forces from the Sinai without risking an effective Egyptian surprise land attack on vital centers within Israel. As always, Israeli deployment after the peace agreement also had advantages and disadvantages in relation to other solutions to the problem of strategic depth on the Egyptian border. The outstanding political advantage was a reduction of tensions in Israeli-Egyptian relations. Militarily, Israel gained from shortening its internal supply lines, thus easing the logistical strain and reducing the time required to transfer forces from one front to another.

At the same time there were a number of disadvantages—new factors which had not been present on the Egyptian front before the Yom Kippur War: the need to readopt “trip wires” in light of the possibility that Egypt might violate the demilitarization conditions; reduction of the warning time of an air attack; and the loss of Israeli forward bases, such as at Sharm el Sheikh, which had provided a capability for offensive operations. Consequently, the military arrangements of the peace with Egypt are a partial return on that front to the concepts that had guided Israeli security policy before 1967. However, unlike in that earlier time, now the triggering of any Israeli preemptive strike in response to a “tripped wire” could occur in the context of an explicit bilateral agreement, the violation of which would constitute an aggressive action.

The concept of a demilitarized or partially demilitarized buffer zone as a substitute for strategic depth (as popularly understood) is only relevant to the conditions of the Egyptian front. Without additional arrangements, such a zone does not sufficiently answer Israel’s military and territorial problems on the Syrian or Jordanian fronts. The Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights does not provide “strategic depth.” Rather, it constitutes a forward position defending the settlements in the Hula and Jordan valleys, which are dominated from the Golan Heights. An Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights could deprive Israel of the territorial element necessary for an effective offensive response to limited Syrian actions, such as an artillery war of attrition or Syrian assistance to Palestinian terrorist infiltration. By such a withdrawal Israel would be denied important military advantages; however, it would not be exposed to a surprise attack that could threaten its existence. Thus any territorial arrangement including Israeli concessions on the Golan Heights will mean a risk in the narrow military-operational context, but not in the strategic context of a threat to Israel’s survival.

Since the signing of the peace treaty with Egypt, the public debates in Israel over strategic depth have focused on the front situated between the Jordan River and the Green Line delineating the 1949 boundary between Israel and Jordan. The West Bank, comprising Judea and Samaria, extends along the “soft underbelly” of Israel, so termed for its proximity to the country’s most vital strategic centers and because of the potential it provides for a successful Arab surprise attack before the IDF could fully mobilize. Thus a nearly general consensus formed early in Israel that the deployment of any enemy forces in Judea and Samaria beyond those required for internal security would undermine Israel’s ability to defend itself with its own forces. Both Jerusalem and Tel Aviv are within the artillery range of the Green Line, and all of Israel’s airfields are within the range of surface-to-air missiles based within the armistice borders of 1949. Armor deployed in the West Bank would be minutes, not hours, away from the Mediterranean Sea; a radar outpost position on the slopes of the Judean hills could deny Israel its deterrence capability, airfields in Judea and Samaria with a capacity for handling jets or large cargo planes would significantly increase the risk of a surprise attack. Under such circumstances, even an Arab state with limited forces could threaten Israel’s existence by moving those forces into Judea and Samaria and coordinating a simultaneous attack on other fronts with other Arab states.
Thus demilitarizing the West Bank of heavy arms or sophisticated weaponry was considered vital by those who held a moderate view on the question of strategic depth. Maximalists, on the other hand, argued that there is a need for Israel to retain military control over the whole of the West Bank.

From a purely military/strategic perspective, the debate in Israel over the West Bank is an argument over whether continued direct military control of Judaea and Samaria is necessary or whether simply denying an enemy a significant military presence there will grant Israel sufficient security. Even the latter view, however, rejects a complete military withdrawal to the pre-1967 armistice borders, because the Israeli ability to guarantee demilitarization of the West Bank is predicated on Israeli control over the routes connecting the two banks of the Jordan. Otherwise, with the technological means available today, and assuming only the use of conventional forces, it would be impossible to maintain the minimal conditions necessary for Israeli self-defense. Therefore, the opposed schools of thought on security that have coalced in Israel over recent years—the “mountain ridge” school and the “Jordan Valley” school—are both based on an assumption that Israel will not completely withdraw its forces from Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip.

Alongside this military debate between the supporters of demilitarization through control of the arteries into the Jordan Valley (and the southern tip of the Gaza Strip) and the proponents of continued control over the whole of the territory conquered in 1967 (with an emphasis on Israeli military presence on the mountain ridge there), a political debate rages over whether Israel’s security border is synonymous with its sovereign border. Each of the two territorial/military schools of thought contain two political views. One view rejects separating sovereignty from military control and aspires to annex the territories it considers strategically vital; the other view distinguishes between a political border—the boundaries of the State of Israel—and a security border—the boundary of Israeli military presence. These conceptual differences are the grounds of the debate over the benefits of civilian settlements in Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, settlements that can be seen as establishing the de facto boundaries of a permanent Israeli presence in the territories.

Differences over the issue of strategic depth evolved gradually after the Six Day War. They did not suddenly appear as a result of the war itself. Once the area of Israeli control extended beyond the minimum required for self-defense, military/instrumental considerations lost their autonomous status and became at least partially dependent on political and ideological factors. This dependence was made even more apparent after the Yom Kippur War, when the theoretical problem of territorial/military deployment within the framework of political arrangements became an actual issue. In such circumstances, the absence of domestic agreement over the territorial issue spread from the political and ideological sphere into the strategic/security sphere.

The Demise of National Consensus

The occupation of the West Bank during the Six Day War freed Israel from the greatest geographical threat to its national security. Consequently, consensus in the Israeli security community came to rest on the rejection of any political arrangement requiring a return to the unstable political and military status quo ante along Israel’s eastern border. Thus most of the proponents of continued Israeli occupation of the territory do not support a complete military withdrawal from the entire territory, which had been under Jordanian control until 1967.

Opinion in Israel is divided over the political and legal status and not just the dimensions of the area to be retained by Israel. However, most formulators of Israeli strategic thinking are convinced there is need for a limited long-term Israeli military presence in certain areas east of the 1949 armistice lines. In order to gloss over other differences, this partial consensus is often stated negatively: “There will be no return to the borders of June 4, 1967.”

This view is based on the presumption that full withdrawal from the territory captured from Jordan in June 1967 is inconsistent with the principle of ensuring Israel’s self-defense capability in all circumstances. The “negative” Israeli consensus vis-à-vis the West Bank is therefore a result of the belief that the demilitarization of the West Bank can only be guaranteed if Israel maintains a territorial base there, to be used by its military forces in the event of a violation of demilitarization.

In terms of security needs unconnected to ideological, historical, or emotional attitudes about the Land of Israel, most policymakers agree that any arrangement for the West Bank and Gaza Strip must: (1) forbid the deployment of enemy armored forces, artillery, and, most of all, surface-to-air missiles, which could prevent planes from taking off from anywhere in Israel; and (2) allow the deployment of Israeli military forces so that they can block any enemy forces advancing from the east until Israel is able to mobilize its reserves and establish a line of defense to retain strategic control over the West Bank.

In this context, it is important to note that the consensus among those with a high level of security and political consciousness vis-à-vis Israel’s eastern border is based only on the need to prevent the West Bank from becoming the source of a military threat to the existence of Israel. This limited consensus is compatible with the presumption that Israel must be
capable, under any condition, of defending itself with its own forces against any single Arab country or coalition of Arab countries. However, it does not address three fundamental issues: the size, location, and status of the territories required to ensure successful Israeli self-defense if attacked from the east. Nor does it suggest a rejection of a return of territories to a sovereign Palestinian entity.

There is a maximalist territorial position that argues that Israel must retain full political and military control over the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip, whether by means of annexation or by granting autonomy “to the population” rather than “to the territory.” According to the conception held by the Likud, Israeli military presence and Israeli settlement activity must both continue in the entire area under any circumstances.44

This is in opposition to the public position of the Israeli Labor party, which supports “territorial compromise”: a repartition of the Land of Israel along borders defined as “defensible.”45 Some of the advocates of this alternative are not altogether rejecting the option of separating the security issue from the source of sovereignty by allowing a limited Israeli military presence in defined areas beyond Israel’s border. The very epitome of territorial compromise is the “Allon Plan,” whose strategic aim is control over the eastern approaches to the West Bank, to be achieved through the annexation of the Jordan Valley, with the exception of a narrow corridor connecting the East Bank to the rear of the West Bank. The West Bank would be demilitarized and linked to Jordan as part of a Jordanian-Palestinian political entity, obviating demand for creation of a third state between Israel and Jordan.46

The political and strategic considerations of the Allon Plan’s proponents, supporters of a “Jordanian option,” do not necessarily prefer negotiations with Jordan instead of the PLO. The belief that existence of a “third state” would make demilitarization of the West Bank more difficult is derived from a strategic point of view that posits that demilitarizing a limited area of a larger political entity is more viable than demilitarizing an entire country. It is also claimed that separating the West Bank from Jordan would transform the Palestinians living on the East Bank into exiles, putting them into a position not unlike the Palestinian population in Lebanon, and would provoke irredentist tendencies among them. However, these considerations are political rather than military-operational.

The territorial debate over the future of the West Bank in the framework of a political resolution of the Palestinian problem is connected to the strategic choice between a defensive orientation requiring capability to withstand unprovoked enemy attack and an offensive orientation requiring preparedness to carry out a preemptive strike. Paradoxically, as in the case of the Sinai, the political hawks who oppose territorial compromise tend to adopt a defensive military orientation that endorses absorption of an enemy strike, while the adherents of dovish political positions who accept a partition of the Land of Israel west of the Jordan River are willing to initiate military action if and when the demilitarization of the West Bank is violated.47

According to the politically hawkish—militarily defensive orientation, Israel’s military deployment in the West Bank must be along the length of the mountain ridge dominating the land lying both west and east.48 The politically dovish orientation, which requires a willingness to take preventive military action under certain circumstances, argues that Israel must maintain a military presence in the narrow, sparsely populated corridor along the length of the Jordan River. Deployment there controls the main routes into the West Bank from the east. The Allon Plan would achieve that control by annexing the Jordan Valley and part of the eastern slopes of the mountains of Judaea and Samaria, except for a corridor near Jericho that will be in Arab hands.49 The Israeli domestic debate over settlement policy in the occupied territories reflects the differences between these two geopolitical strategies: the settlement efforts of the governments of Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir, and Yitzhak Rabin concentrated on the Jordan Valley; whereas the settlements initiated by the Begin government were spread over the entire West Bank.50

This difference led to disagreement over the military value of settlements in the Nablus area as manifested in the conflicting statements presented by then chief of staff, Major-General Rafael Eitan, and former chief of staff, Major-General (ret.) Chaim Bar-Lev, to the Supreme Court concerning the proposed Jewish settlement of Elon Moreh.51 Each of these geopolitical orientations toward the future of the West Bank contains two versions of the postagreement political status of the territories that will remain under Israeli control: one essentially “annexationist,” the other based on a military presence without annexation.

Autonomy as a permanent solution can be the basis for retaining control of the mountain ridge without annexing it; military deployment in the Jordan Valley in the framework of a partition of the western Land of Israel (that which lies west of the Jordan River) is possible by distinguishing between Israel’s political and security boundaries. This distinction would enable the Israeli military to be present in the Jordan Valley without having to annex territory in terms of sovereignty, for however many years it will take for the sources of Israeli-Arab tensions to disappear.52 The disagreement over the minimal territorial conditions necessary for preserving Israeli defensive capabilities underscores the fact that a consensus no longer exists on security matters. The demise of this consensus began in the wake of the Six Day War and accelerated after the Yom Kippur War. The War of 1967 expanded the area under Israeli control beyond what had been considered the minimum necessary for a secure
national existence. As a result, there was an opening for ideological and political considerations to insinuate themselves into Israeli security thinking, so that the defense establishment, including the high command of the IDF, could no longer maintain the autonomy traditionally accorded those in the field of professional security considerations.

Recognition of the dependence of strategic decisions on politics and ideology undermined the autonomous standing of the defense establishment, which in the past had been able to formulate security doctrines and policies acceptable to holders of disparate and even opposing political views. The demise of the national consensus after the October 1973 War was catalyzed by the beginning of political negotiations and mediation designed to resolve, or at least ameliorate, the Arab-Israeli conflict. Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy," the separation-of-forces agreements with Egypt and Syria, the 1975 interim agreement with Egypt, Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the Camp David Accords, and the peace treaty with Egypt shifted the balance between strategic and political considerations in favor of the latter. These developments also legitimized public debate over national security issues, including such problems as the value of "strategic depth" versus security arrangements, or the preemptive strike versus the "capacity to withstand attack."

The demise of the consensus on national security was also affected by Israeli domestic politics, as the 1977 elections brought the end of twenty-nine years of single-party hegemony. Labor party domination of the political arena until then had meant not only their dictating the composition of governing coalitions, but also their general influence on the political orientations of most of those parties aspiring to join those coalitions. The rule of Labor even left its mark on the world view of the Israeli establishment as a whole.

The political, intellectual, and bureaucratic elite in Israel adopted the principal features of Labor's political culture: pragmatism, construction of consensus through compromise, and moderation in political/security questions. Thus the 1977 elections had a significance far beyond simply bringing a change of government. The political vision of Herut, the dominant faction in Likud, was the product of intellectual, fundamentalist, and jingoist traditions bearing no resemblance to the pragmatic ethos of the government coalition under the Labor alignment. This dichotomy estranged the new leadership from its political opposition, whose political approach also remained that of most of the public-sector bureaucracy and substantial parts of the economic, intellectual, cultural, technocratic, and even military elites. The chasm between the two large parties had a limited impact on the sphere of national security as long as pragmatic politicians with military backgrounds such as Ezer Weizman and Moshe Dayan controlled the machinery of security policy. Their resignations, brought on by their failure to adjust to Menachem Begin's political style, magnified the policy differences between government and opposition, and seemed to further dissolve the national consensus.

The disagreements over security policy reflected both a change in security doctrine and a schism between two political cultures. These disagreements arose over the timing of the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor, the downing of Syrian helicopters in Lebanon, and a war for the Galilee (called Operation Peace in the Galilee). There were four other strategic and political developments that would have further reduced the autonomy of military/security (vis-a-vis political) considerations, had the defense establishment itself not become more amenable to military initiatives:

1. The peace treaty with Egypt and negotiations on Palestinian autonomy
2. The increasing political, military, and economic dependence of Israel on the United States
3. The reduced political value of military success
4. The threat of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Because the autonomy of military/security considerations had in the past facilitated formation of a national consensus on security, the changes that now served to obfuscate the boundary between political and security priorities made formulation of an agreed national security doctrine nearly impossible.

The Peace with Egypt

Signs of a peace agreement with a central Arab state bordering Israel altered the balance between political and military considerations in Israeli national security doctrine. For some thirty years Egypt had been the most powerful military component of the anti-Israel coalition, the only Arab state to go to war against Israel five times—in 1948, 1956, 1957, 1973, and the War of Attrition (1969–1970). The cessation of this state of war and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries accorded Israel the status of a recognized player in Middle Eastern diplomacy for the first time in its history. Previously, Israel had been indirectly involved in interstate relations in the Middle East, including inter-Arab relations. But these contacts had either been direct or secret, such as the relations with Jordan and Morocco, or indirect and thus dependent on the mediation of countries from outside the region.

The exceptions to this rule were Israel's relations with non-Arab countries, such as Iran and Turkey, which border the periphery of the
Middle East. Peace with Egypt changed all this. It increased considerably the relative importance of diplomacy at the expense of the military factor in the Middle East. Although the Israeli definition of the components of national security did not change, the tendency to view military priorities as immanent to the situation was indeed weakened. For instance, the new diplomatic process did not affect the Israeli security axiom, that the country's very existence was at stake in the conflict and that no political arrangement could replace the necessity for Israeli self-sufficiency in its own defense.

The peace treaty was first and foremost a product of the view that the peace agreement itself was born of Israel's military capability of defeating any Arab attempt to settle the conflict by force. This view finds expression in the general consensus in Israeli national security thinking whereby any Arab-Israeli peace will be armed peace, made possible by a military equilibrium that ensures Israeli ability to repulse on its own any Arab military initiative.

From a military perspective the peace treaty with Egypt was thought to have significantly reduced the possibility that Israel would have to fight a war on two fronts simultaneously, at least in the initial stages of the Arab attack. Thus it put into question the continued relevance of certain basic assumptions of Israeli national security doctrine. The end of a state of war between Israel and one of its most powerful enemies meant that the relations between the two countries could no longer be described as "dormant war," with all its ramifications for the legitimate use of a preemptive military strike.

With the probability of Egyptian participation in an Arab attack on Israel significantly reduced, Israel, while not completely discounting the possibility, could at least expect a delayed Egyptian reaction in the event of renewed hostilities. Optimism regarding Egypt's intentions to honor its new obligations might not be compatible with a worst-case scenario, but Israel nevertheless agreed to concede real military assets, such as the Sinai airfields and the port in Sharm el Sheik, in return for less tangible assets, such as a peace agreement and normalization of relations.

The Growing Dependence on the United States

The dramatic rise in the price of oil in the wake of the Yom Kippur War and the subsequent flow of petrodollars to the Arab states in the Gulf stimulated the Middle Eastern arms race, both in quality and quantity, and made it prohibitively expensive for Israel to participate in this race without considerable foreign aid. In the 1960s Israel had been able to sustain a faster military build-up than the Arab states could. This was largely due to its much higher GNP. The wars of 1967 and 1973, however, transformed that situation. In 1967 peripheral Arab states (those not bordering Israel) deepened their involvement in the conflict, and Arab strategic efforts as a whole were discernibly greater.

The 1973 War and the ensuing energy crisis enabled the Arab states to vastly increase their investments in a military infrastructure without having to pay a significant economic price. Those economic obstacles that had earlier hindered Arab military expansion were now almost entirely absent, and in the years since the Yom Kippur War the rate of Arab military expansion has been free of budgetary constraints. Such expansion has been determined, instead, almost exclusively by political desire and organizational and technological capabilities in the development of efficient military power. The world's arms market was almost completely open to the oil-producing countries and no effective political constraints have been placed on their participation in a conventional arms race.

These developments meant Israel could not stay in the arms race without significantly increasing the level of resources it channeled to security needs and deepening its dependence on foreign aid. The defense budget now consumed a considerably larger percentage of national expenditure, and this in turn contributed to unprecedented inflation and a halt in economic growth. Israel's foreign debt also increased significantly. Domestic debate broke out over the scale of defense expenditures, with political implications for the peace process as well as military implications pertaining to the size of the IDF. This debate also included discussions of a nuclear option in Israel's future system of defense. Israeli dependence on the United States now increased in two ways: the United States became Israel's only source of modern sophisticated weaponry (even the Israeli-produced Kfir aircraft and Merkava tank were driven by U.S.-built motors); and Israel's own resources were insufficient to purchase the weapons systems it needed.

Israeli dependence on the United States in maintaining strategic parity with the Arab states provided the U.S. government an efficacious means for influencing Israeli policy in the conflict. The United States exploited this situation at least twice. The first instance was the "reevaluation" of U.S. Middle East policy undertaken in 1975, during which the Ford administration forbade any new arms purchases. The embargo was rescinded in September 1975 when Israel signed the interim agreement with Egypt, an agreement not significantly different from the U.S. proposals of March 1975, whose rejection by Israel had precipitated the so-called reevaluation.

The second instance of U.S. use of its leverage over Israeli policy occurred during the Reagan administration. In June 1981 the United States suspended shipments of F-16 warplanes to Israel in response to the
Israeli destruction of Iraq's nuclear installation. This short-term suspension acquired political effect after Israel launched an air offensive against the PLO in Lebanon. Israeli bombing of Palestinian targets led the Reagan administration to extend the suspension, even though its repeal had been imminent once the United States secured Israeli agreement to restrict the use of U.S. weapons in the wake of the Iraqi action.

This decision had its desired effect: Israel accepted a cease-fire mediated by the United States without having achieved its military aim against the PLO in Lebanon. The 1981 suspension, unlike the “reevaluation” of 1975, prohibited delivery of weapons that had already been sold to Israel, and was used to impose a cease-fire that lasted until the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The Israeli need to consider U.S. policy interests was not just born of military considerations, however. The dependence on U.S. arms was secondary to Israel’s political and diplomatic dependence, which deepened as a result of Israel’s international isolation. The reasons for Israel’s increased isolation were varied:

1. The break of diplomatic relations with many Third World countries, particularly in Africa.
2. The disappearance of relatively friendly regimes such as the Pahlavi’s in Iran, which had been pillars of an Israeli “peripheral” strategy based on cooperation with the non-Arab neighbors of Arab countries.
3. The pro-Arab atmosphere in Europe resulting from Europe’s increasing dependence on Arab oil, the search for Arab investments, and the importance of Arab markets, combined with an increased sympathy for the Palestinian cause.

An additional political factor, not directly stemming from Israeli isolation but certainly contributing to the dependence on the United States, was the U.S. role as mediator between Israel and the Arab countries, including Egypt. Israel preferred U.S. mediation to that by any other country, in particular to any diplomatic initiatives which would involve the Soviet Union. It was understood that in return Israel would voluntarily restrict its own freedom of action.

Ben-Gurion always insisted that Israel should never deny itself a reliable source of arms. He stressed the importance of avoiding any military initiatives on a large scale unless Israel could rely on a world power that would rearm the IDF. However, the first Israeli-initiated war under Ben-Gurion’s leadership, the Sinai War of 1956, showed that while his conditions were indeed essential, they were not sufficient for attainment of Israeli war aims.

U.S. pressure forced Israel to withdraw from the Sinai and the Gaza Strip in 1956, in spite of the steady supply of arms Israel was receiving from France. On the other hand, the decision to go to war in 1967 was based on the not entirely justified expectation that the United States would come to terms with the Israeli decision after the fact. Israeli dependence on the United States grew significantly between the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War, principally as a result of Soviet intervention in the War of Attrition along the Suez Canal in 1970. Since then the makers of Israeli policy have tended to distinguish three levels of dependency on the United States:

2. Military dependence: Purchase of arms from the only world power whose arsenal can match in terms of quality, dependability, and sophistication the Soviet arms that were available to the Arabs.
3. Economic dependence: U.S. financial aid enabling Israel to maintain its tremendous efforts in the security sphere without sacrificing either its standard of living or the economic growth essential for absorbing immigration.

Prior to the 1973 War the United States granted greater autonomy to Israeli political and military decisions. There were several reasons for this:

(1) The role of Israel in the September 1970 Jordanian-Syrian crisis enhanced its status as a dependable U.S. ally, whereas Syria and even Egypt (at least until July 1972) were still considered allies of the Soviet Union; (2) Israeli military superiority was thought to deny the Arabs a military option, thus continuation of the status quo was not perceived as a source of instability; (3) The Israeli demand of Arab recognition and direct negotiations as a condition for any Arab-Israeli arrangement was not explicitly rejected by either the Johnson or the Nixon administrations; (4) In conditions of full employment, a relatively rapid rate of economic growth, and a manageable defense budget, Israeli sensitivity to political pressure by means of economic aid was still minimal.

The 1973 War, ensuing oil crisis, and resulting political, military, and economic developments increased the effectiveness of U.S. pressure on Israel as well as, albeit to a lesser extent, U.S. willingness to employ such pressure. The first indication of this new level of dependence was the Israeli request for an airlift before the end of the October fighting. Even though it afterwards became clear that Israel had held sufficient spare parts and ammunition stores, equipment losses did mean that sooner or later they would have to be replaced in order to counter the flow of Soviet arms to Egypt and Syria. Moreover, one of the lessons of this war was the difficulty in fighting a full-scale confrontation on two fronts without a
significantly larger IDF.

Israeli purchases of U.S. arms reached record levels in the years following the 1973 War. But Israel was also in need of qualitative improvement in the form of new weapons systems appropriate to the 1980s. The decision to modernize the IDF war machine was also a response to the increased petrodollar purchases of military hardware by Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and the Arab Emirates, some of which was put at the disposal of the “confrontation” states. As a result, after the October War of 1973, Israel required the good will of the United States in order to maintain an acceptable military parity with its neighbors. This increased the weight of political factors in the Israeli conception of national security.

The Diminishing Political Returns of Military Success

The absence of strategic depth was not the only motive for the IDF’s adoption of an offensive operative posture. That orientation was also a product of Israel’s overall strategic doctrine, whose concept was defensive. An offensive offensive was designed to end hostilities as quickly as possible, consistent with the strategic emphasis on defense. In other words, Israel’s inability to defeat the enemy made it essential to achieve a clear limited victory on the battlefield so that the war would end with Israel’s achievement of the limited aims of its overall preventive strategy. As such, Israeli doctrine stressed the importance of a swift, decisive, and indisputable resolution of battle. Ending a war without such clear operative results would constitute a strategic failure. This was the source of the Israeli determination “to bring the war onto the enemy’s territory and to threaten his vital strategic targets as well as the actual physical integrity of his army, in order to force the enemy to end active hostilities.”

In 1956 and 1967 Israel’s military operations fulfilled the requirements of this offensive orientation. Such success was not repeated in either the War of Attrition or the 1973 War. The latter two wars were initiated by the enemy and Israeli victory was neither swift nor unequivocal. Fighting was not waged in “enemy territory” in the operative sense (even though these were territories captured in 1967); vital strategic enemy targets were not seriously harmed; and the very survival of the opposing army was not threatened, as it had been in 1967. Consequently there was disagreement in Israel over whether the Arabs actually lost these wars or not. The ambiguous outcomes of the 1970 War of Attrition and the 1973 Yom Kippur War were Egyptian political triumphs, at least in part, because Egypt had waged limited wars designed to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Israeli strategic conception. Egyptian policymakers and military planners, and to a lesser degree their counterparts in Syria as well, were aware of Israel’s difficulty in translating its offensive concept at the operative level into the defensive aims of its strategic doctrine, aims that were those of a “status quo country.”

The 1967 War had taught the Arabs that they faced an antithetical situation: their offensive strategic goal was to overturn the post-1948 status quo, meaning that their forces had to be prepared for offensive defensive warfare. The Arab dilemma was thus an inversion of the Israeli problem: Armies with quantitative superiority but qualitative inferiority sought to combine an offensive strategy with defensive operative tactics in order to successfully face an army quantitatively inferior but qualitatively superior, which was acting to fulfill defensive strategic aims using offensive military tactics.

The War of Attrition was the first Arab attempt to answer this dilemma. It was not, from their point of view, a successful one. The war’s unvictorious conclusion was an Israeli strategic success: no significant alteration of the territorial status quo was effected and the change that did occur in the political status quo-Israeli acceptance of U.N. Resolution 242—was no real strategic achievement. Therefore, on the eve of the 1973 War, Egypt adopted a more complex strategy of limited war, combining an offensive strategy with defensive tactics as a second stage following an initial strategic and tactical offensive. This allowed the Egyptians to exploit the advantages of surprise and Israel’s need to mobilize reserves in order to attain full strength. Capturing territory at the outset of the fighting and then using highly concentrated firepower from defensive positions against Israeli counterattacks made it possible for Egypt to achieve the clearly indecisive operative results of the battle it sought.

Under these circumstances the absence of an unequivocal battlefield victory had a different significance than it had in the War of Attrition. Now, unless the Egyptians withdrew from the territory they had captured, the war’s result could be considered an Arab strategic success. Israel had not been defeated militarily, but the status quo had been distinctly overturned. At the same time, a war of attrition remained an option in the north. The Syrians were aware of Israel’s general quandary in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War and hoped to exploit it to achieve some alteration, no matter how modest, of the status quo in the Golan Heights.

From this perspective, the separation-of-forces agreement between Israel and Syria, signed in May 1974, is worthy of examination. More than the 1970 cease-fire along the Suez Canal, this agreement highlighted a dilemma that would haunt Israel in the future: how can a war of attrition be ended without Israel paying too high a price in casualties while successfully denying the enemy even a partial political success? Israel’s territorial concessions on the Golan Heights (including the
withdrawal from Kuneitra), which made a separation-of-forces agreement with Syria possible, cannot be attributed solely or even primarily to the Syrian War of Attrition. Nevertheless, because Syrian actions did influence Israeli willingness to grant them “spoils,” the option of a renewed Syrian war of attrition is a potential threat for which Israel must plan. In order not to surrender to strategic extortion, allowing the enemy to achieve his political aims without achieving a victory in battle, any war of attrition must be escalated.

There are two methods for effecting such escalation: (1) a “tactical” war of attrition can be turned into a “strategic” war of attrition by attacking the enemy’s infrastructure from the air; or (2) a war of attrition can be made “mobile” by taking an offensive initiative and provoking the outbreak of full-scale war. Israel tested the first method during the War of Attrition along the Suez Canal in 1969–1970 when IAF deep-penetration bombing of Egypt provoked controlled Soviet intervention in the form of Soviet assistance to Egyptian air defenses. One cannot discount the possibility of this type of limited outside intervention in an Israeli/Syrian confrontation originating in a Syrian war of attrition and escalating into an Israeli attack on the Syrian strategic infrastructure. But in a war of attrition the efficacy of air attack, or air attack combined with commando raids behind enemy lines, is dependent on whether or not the enemy has a war-making infrastructure. This is not the case in Syria, whose industrial and logistical base is underdeveloped and whose military might rests on the resources of oil-producing countries and the technological capabilities of industrialized countries such as the former Soviet Union. This is why the Israeli strike against the Syrian rear during the Yom Kippur War had such little effect on Syria’s ability to rebuild militarily after the cease-fire.

In the absence of any real enemy strategic infrastructure, one cannot expect air attacks against military/logistical and civilian targets to force the enemy to accept a cease-fire, as long as that enemy has not yet achieved any political advantages. The experience of World War II and the Vietnam War proved that air offensives are inefficient means of one side imposing its will on the other. Thus the payoff from escalating a tactical war of attrition into a strategic war of attrition may be negative. In addition to losing planes and pilots, Israel can no longer disregard the possibility of an enemy attack against its own rear. The more developed a country, the more vulnerable it is to strikes at its logistical infrastructure. This relative vulnerability was not significant in past confrontations because the Israeli air force was successful in preventing penetration by enemy aircraft. The introduction of surface-to-surface missiles into the region removed this advantage. Syrian Scud missiles, or even Frog missiles fired from Lebanon, in spite of their lack of precision, can cause great damage to the dense concentration of infrastructure targets situated around Haifa Bay. The oil refineries, chemical industries, Haifa power station, Haifa airport, Israeli shipyards, the port of Kishon and, not far away, the port of Haifa itself, constitute an easy collection of targets. The possible results of a salvo of surface-to-surface missiles fired at those targets must be added to the equation of costs and benefits in a strategic war of attrition.

The second option in the event of a war of attrition initiated by the enemy is the offensive use of ground forces to turn a static war of attrition into a mobile war. This option is compatible with Israel’s offensive orientation, which assigns armor the “decisive operative and strategic function in ground battle.” However, most of Israel’s ground forces, including its armor and artillery, consist of reserve units, making this type of escalation inviable without a large-scale mobilization of reserves.

The impossibility of concealing such a mobilization means Israel is liable to find itself taking the offensive without the element of surprise. This will raise the cost in casualties and prolong the time necessary to achieve an operative decision in battle. Of course, the restrictions that mobilization places on the chances for surprise are not only germane to escalating a war of attrition: they are equally relevant to a preventive Israeli attack. In 1956 this problem was solved by making the place of the attack the surprise: the mobilization of reserves was attributed to tensions on the Jordanian front, but the IDF actually attacked on the Egyptian front. In 1967 Egypt was surprised by the timing and method of the offensive—the initial air strike against Egyptian airfields. The surprise in timing was achieved by mobilizing the reserves in response to Egyptian troop concentrations and then turning the waiting period preceding the 1967 War into an opportunity for the Israelis to choose the date of attack. Similar conditions are apt to occur in a war of attrition, although the size of the force needed to fight a war of attrition does not resemble the requirements for carrying out a large-scale ground offensive.

The parallels between the use of reserves in a preventive offensive and an offensive designed to escalate a war of attrition do not necessarily hold in other contexts. The initiation of a war and the escalation of a war of attrition have different aims. In the absence of any general strategic resolution of the whole conflict, Israel would be satisfied in a preventive war with a limited victory based on capturing territory, destroying enemy forces, or both. In the escalation of a war of attrition, or any other limited war initiated by the enemy, Israel aspires to compel the enemy to cease fighting before it can achieve any of its political goals; in this instance, capturing territory and destroying enemy forces are simply means to that end.

Thus, in a preventive, Israel-initiated war, a cease-fire preceding any capture of territory or destruction of enemy forces signals a failure, as is not true when the aim is to force the enemy to cease hostile actions without
achieving certain political ends. The difference, then, depends on the origin of the military initiative. This is a difference between a confrontation imposed upon Israel and one that Israel could have avoided or prevented.

Suppressing enemy action by means of military escalation requires effecting an alteration in the enemy's cost-benefit analysis for waging a limited war. In other words, the escalation will accomplish its aims if it creates a situation in which the enemy decides the price of continuing the war is higher than that of ending it. On the other hand, in a preventive war initiated by Israel, a cease-fire will be determined by an Israeli analysis of the cost-benefit equation. Obviously the difference between these two determinants rests on the presumption that in this conflict there is no zero sum relation, in which one side always gains from the other's loss.

A preventive war is undesirable from the Israeli perspective if it does not change the balance of forces in its favor. Thus the aim of destroying enemy forces, which means essentially destroying material, is pointless if the enemy can then use external resources to rebuild its forces faster than Israel, even if Israeli losses from the fighting were considerably less. By the same token it is pointless to capture territory in a preventive war unless it is assured beforehand that no international pressure to return to the political and territorial status quo ante will follow.

In this context, it can be argued that the international constellation in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, the energy crisis, and Israel's economic and political condition significantly reduced the general value of an Israeli-initiated preventive war, because it was more difficult for Israel to recover its losses without increasing its dependence on the United States, a fact that was all the more true regarding the retention of captured territory. In contrast, Israel's enemies have greater access to the resources necessary for recovering their losses. Thus it had been said that the Arabs could afford another loss, but Israel would have difficulty withstanding another victory. This adage reflects the asymmetrical nature of the conflict: Israel's inability to achieve a strategic victory makes it difficult to translate any operative military success into a durable political asset. In effect, then, even without considering Israel's extreme sensitivity to casualties, it is possible to claim that for Israel, as a "status quo country," any war that can be avoided is a net savings.

Signs of a transformation in Israel's concept of security first became apparent with the changes in the leadership of the security apparatus after Ariel Sharon's appointment as minister of defense. These changes acquired even greater significance in light of the government's ideology on the Palestinian question. They were given operational expression in the invasion of Lebanon. The revised concept of security that led to the Lebanon War no longer sought to prevent a threat to Israel's survival by means of defensive self-sufficiency, nor was it derived from Israel's conception of itself as a "status quo country." Rather, war was intended to be fought with the expressed purpose of achieving political aims unconnected to any concept of prevention. Thus the only war aim that had commanded popular national consensus—"preventing a threat to the country's existence by means of Israel's own might"—was undermined.

The offensive strategic conception was an unqualified endorsement of Clausewitz's claim that "war is the continuation of diplomacy, but by other means." The strategic doctrine of employing force for the purpose of rearranging the political order in the Middle East was articulated by the three central Israeli figures in the War in Lebanon: Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon, and Chief of Staff Major-General Rafael Eitan. On several occasions the chief of staff stated that the IDF's strength was intended to be used. In other words, Israeli power would no longer be directed towards deterrence, as had been posited in the past.

Ariel Sharon explained that Israel's war aims in Operation Peace for the Galilee were more than "basic" defensive/existental aims. He listed a number of "subsidiary objectives" that had been formulated well before the start of the fighting, rather than being retroactively applied to events once the war had been joined. Among these was the expulsion of the Syrians from Lebanon and creation of conditions for a new, pro-Israeli regime in Lebanon. Ariel Sharon's use of "subsidiary objectives" was a de facto and unprecedented departure from the national consensus on the question, "What prompts Israel to go to war?"

In turn, Prime Minister Menachem Begin had tried to justify the War in Lebanon, arguing that Israel should go to war "not just when there is no choice." Here the dichotomy between "wars of no choice" and "wars of choice" surfaces. Begin argued that only wars begun by the enemy, such as the War of Independence or the Yom Kippur War, were "wars of no choice." All the rest, without distinguishing between preemptive strikes, preventive wars, or wars designed to alter the status quo, were "wars of choice." According to Begin, the Lebanon War was waged in order to avoid a costlier, more terrible war in the future. This is the antithesis of the previous conception of a war not fought as being a net savings.

These new, expanded answers to the basic issues of "When should Israel go to war?" and "Over what should Israel go to war?" created deep rifts in the Israeli body politic, undermining the national consensus on matters of national security. Adoption of a broad offensive strategy is bound to entail two additional consequences:

1. Greater autonomy for the defense establishment in planning and using force during war, as well as in advance preparations, raising ques-
tions about the effectiveness of civilian control over the security and military echelons. This is how, at strategic intersections, tactical problems develop in the field that then affect the strategic decisions of a political echelon left with no choice but to retroactively accept the consequences of these developments. These situations recurred continuously during the course of the Lebanon War: for instance, in the air force’s bombing of Beirut on the eve of the terrorists’ departure, or in the IDF’s entrance into West Beirut.69

2. A change in the “exchange rate” between the anticipated profits of a military action and its cost. In the preventive concept, Israel initiated a war only in the face of a threat to its existence. This had been the grounds for estimating the risks of an operation as well as its implications for Israel’s present and future ability to defend itself. Israel’s offensive strategy not only weighs these risks against questions of survival, but against political benefits as well. Now a new price list for war can be drawn up: (1) cost in casualties—losses in lives; (2) economic cost; (3) political cost—the country’s diplomatic standing; (4) cost in terms of national consensual and popular morale; and (5) overall cost-taking greater risks means a greater chance of failure. It is apparent that the broadening of operative aims that results from a replacement of an offensive for a defensive concept at the strategic level raises the cost of war. This is measured, for instance, in the number of casualties sustained by Israeli forces in the Lebanon War after crossing the forty-kilometer line—which delineated the preventive aim of removing the threat to Israel’s northern settlements from strategic offensive aims. Losses were far greater after that line was crossed.70

The Lebanon War also represented a new perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict in general. This is largely a difference in emphasis between conceiving of the conflict as a national, ideological, and intermecine one, or as a strategic, interstate one. From the War of Independence until the elections of 1977, Israeli governments had always emphasized the regional, interstate nature of the conflict, seeking at the same time to reduce its national/ideological, intermecine component.71 This made it possible to distinguish between current security and fundamental security. By attributing most expressions of the intermecine level to the sphere of day-to-day security, Israeli policymakers were able to raise the threshold for war to a level that ultimately reduced the chances of starting a war. This was the reason why military actions undertaken at the intermecine level (usually against terrorist organizations) did not violate the general rule governing military operations for periods of “low intensity warfare.”72

Even on the eve of the Sinai campaign, when there was some support for initiating a war in response to fedayeen terror, this was still only one of several causes for the war, nor was it necessarily the most important: the 1955 Czech-Egyptian arms transaction and the freedom of navigation provoked Israeli fears for survival on the interstate level of the conflict and thus played no less essential a role in provoking the subsequent fighting.73 Accordingly, transferring emphasis from the interstate to the intermecine levels of the conflict mainly influences two spheres:

1. In the operative-military sphere it lowers the threshold at which Israel will go to war, thus increasing the chances of war breaking out over intermecine tensions, such as in response to terrorist activity.
2. In the political/strategic sphere it emphasizes the political, intermecine aspect of the conflict, thus reducing the chance for an interstate territorial compromise in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The change in the prevailing concept of security had operational ramifications that inverted the Israeli responses to the questions “Over what should Israel go to war?” and “When should Israel go to war?” If, as in the previous concept, Israel goes to war when threatened, or weak, and/or unsure of its ability to defeat the enemy in the future, it does not do so whenever its military capabilities are at maximum levels and the possibilities for exploiting strategic conditions optimal. Moreover, rather paradoxically, making peace with one or another Arab state does not reduce the chances for war, but actually increases them. By significantly reducing the danger of war on the Egyptian front, for instance, the treaty with Egypt allows Israel to concentrate greater force for initiating a war on other fronts.

Differently stated, if the new concept is extended to its logical conclusion, the stronger the IDF, the more—not the less—chance there is that Israel will initiate a war. This last implication of the new approach has special significance in light of the Israeli need for U.S. military and economic assistance in maintaining a balance of forces in the Middle East. Given such an approach, Israel can no longer claim that its strength is a stabilizing factor in the Middle East. While its military might still acts as a deterrent, thus reducing the chances of an Arab-initiated war against Israel, as long as Israel adheres to a policy of “exploitation of opportunities,” the possibility of an Israeli-initiated war is liable to be greater.

This “exploitation of opportunities” dominated defense policy as long as Ariel Sharon served as minister of defense. With the appointment of Moshe Arens to that post, there were signs of a return to the traditional orientation whereby Israel only goes to war for preventive purposes; that is, only when war is essential for Israeli security. The return to the traditional approach became apparent with the formation of the National Unity government in 1984 and the appointment of Yitzhak Rabin as
minister of defense. This change paved the way for an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, except for a narrow security zone along the Israeli northern border. It has also facilitated the renewal of the tacit understanding with Syria on Red Lines, delineating the thresholds of Israeli resistance to Syrian intervention.

The Nuclear Issue

One of the implicit assumptions of the Israeli national security doctrine all along has been that the efforts to develop a nuclear option be kept separate from nonnuclear military thinking. The dominant concept directed Israel to maintain a conventional military capability, independent of the status of its “nuclear option.” This approach gives operative meaning to the statement “Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.” A “bomb in the basement” can only be considered an “option” so long as no one expects Israel to need it in a conventional war.

In this context, the dual meaning of the concept “to introduce” is not just a deliberate effort to enjoy the advantages of a nuclear option (deterrence) without its disadvantages (the increased chance that other countries in the region will acquire nuclear weapons), it also reconciled two contradictory goals: delaying for as long as possible the overt nuclearization of the Arab-Israeli conflict while actually developing a nuclear capability, in anticipation that it is only a matter of time before the region becomes nuclearized. This formulation is attributed to Yigal Allon, who maintained that although Israel would not be the first, it must certainly not be the second. Logic consequently dictated developing the most-ready-for-use option, possibly while keeping it “in the basement” in the sense of avoiding its use against the enemy devoid of nuclear capability.

This Israeli position reduces the ambiguity regarding Israel’s nuclear capabilities to a single question: What is the actual state of this capability? It also denies Israel the option of detectable nuclear tests, as well as the option of a public declaration of the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons in order to deter conventional conflict. Another possibility, but one incompatible with this conception, is the use of nuclear weapons in a preventive attack designed to delay the development of an Arab nuclear capability. In other words, by avoiding the “introduction” of nuclear weapons, Israel implicitly acknowledges a boundary between the current exclusive use of conventional armaments in Middle East regional conflicts, and a future nuclear age, which Israeli policy aims to postpone.

In this regard Begin’s government continued the policy of the Rabin government before it, viewing an Israeli nuclear capability as being directed first and foremost against the future deployment of nuclear weapons throughout the region. This policy provides for other uses of the nuclear option. It can be a weapon of last resort, as well as for an alternative strategy if the United States were to discontinue its support of Israel’s ability to defend itself with conventional arms. As a last resort, a “bomb in the basement” obviates the possibility of Israel’s destruction at the hands of the Arabs without the latter suffering a similar, and unacceptable, fate. It has been claimed that Sadat’s decision to come to Jerusalem was partly due to his estimation that Israel had already acquired a nuclear option. As an alternative to the conventional balance of forces, having an effective nuclear capability minimizes the probability of an arms embargo: it is difficult to imagine any U.S. administration interested in pushing Israel into a position requiring it to rely on nuclear weapons for its defense.

Several academics have challenged the “bomb in the basement” concept. Similar criticism has been hinted at by Israeli political figures, most notably Moshe Dayan. The critique of these nuclear hawks was directed at Israel’s low profile over possible use of its independent nuclear capability. Instead, they advocate Israeli renunciation of its obligation not to introduce nuclear weapons into the region. The key arguments of the nuclear hawks, some of them political doves supporting a withdrawal from the occupied territories, can be summarized as follows:

1. Israel is already considered a nuclear power by Arab and Western countries, regardless of whether or not it adopts a declared nuclear strategy.
2. The proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East is unavoidable, and their appearance in Arab arsenals is no longer dependent on Israeli policy.
3. A public declaration of Israel’s nuclear option will reduce fears in Israel of a conventional attack, paving the way for a withdrawal from the occupied territories.
4. A security system based on a nuclear option will enable Israel to reduce the increasingly unbearable economic costs of maintaining its conventional forces.
5. A security system based on a nuclear capability will reduce Israel’s dependence on the United States.

The opposing view, that of the nuclear doves, is consistent with the Israeli defense establishment’s strategic conception, whereby Israel will continue to fortify its defenses against conventional attack with equivalent conventional forces, and thus will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, even if there is an “effective nuclear capability.”
According to this view:\textsuperscript{80}

1. The popular opinion that Israel has developed usable nuclear weapons does not make Israel a nuclear state (for better or for worse) because the international community still has no hard evidence that such a weapon exists in Israel (lacking, for instance, the evidence provided by a nuclear test).

2. Any decision to base Israel's defense on a nuclear option would make it easier for the Arabs to acquire nuclear weapons and more difficult for Israel to delay that eventuality by diplomatic means or by a preemptive military strike. In any event, Israel would be unable to justify such an action, either morally or politically.

3. Israeli acquisition of a nuclear option cannot actively replace a conventional defense because Israel must maintain an effective, nonescalatory response to limited conventional attack. The risks of using nuclear weapons suffice to deter Israel from resorting to them in the event of a war of attrition or any other "low-profile" confrontation initiated by the enemy. Accordingly, nuclear arms can complement a conventional arsenal, but cannot substitute for it.

4. As long as Israel must maintain parity of conventional forces, a nuclear capability cannot significantly ease either its economic burden or the burden of its political dependence on the United States.

5. The conditions of the Arab-Israeli conflict are not conducive to creating a stable system of mutual deterrence: the severity of the conflict and the near-total absence of direct contacts between the two sides prevent the creation of the channels of communication essential for averting possibly disastrous decisions. The number of states and sundry other independent actors in the conflict creates the danger of a catalytic war in which an unaligned third party attacks one of the two opposing sides, provoking a nuclear exchange between them.

6. The extra sense of security provided by a nuclear capability is equally liable to be used as justification to annex the territories as to compromise over them.

7. The rational behavior of certain parties to the conflict is not guaranteed in any given situation.

The destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981 revealed another aspect of the Israeli nuclear strategic dilemma: To what extent is Israel willing to employ its conventional might in thwarting Arab efforts to acquire a military nuclear option? Beyond the almost mutually dependent reactions of the many die-hard doves and hawks in Israel, this episode uncovered an inconsistency between nuclear hawks and nuclear doves and their respective stands over conventional strikes designed to prevent Arab acquisition of nuclear weapons.

In a seeming paradox, systematic strategic thought should lead nuclear doves to take conventional military risks in order to slow the pace of the nuclear arms race in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Comparison of the positions of nuclear doves and nuclear hawks reveals that the latter tend to be more optimistic about the chances of achieving a stable regional system of mutual nuclear deterrence and more pessimistic about Israel's ability to prevent nuclear weapons from appearing in the Middle East. Furthermore, the employment of military force in order to delay nuclear proliferation in the region will make it more difficult for Israel to morally and politically justify a conception based primarily on nuclear power as a defense against conventional attack. Such a conception would require Israel to renounce its previous obligation not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons.

Such a change, whether by means of a nuclear test or a public announcement of an effective nuclear capability and the willingness to use it, is incompatible with political and military efforts to prevent the nuclearization of Arab states. A position that simultaneously posits Israel's right to defend itself against conventional attack with nuclear weapons, while using conventional forces to prevent Arab nuclearization, is so completely unacceptable from the international perspective that it is difficult to imagine any Israeli government publicly adopting such a policy.

On the other hand, adopting a doctrine of nuclear defense against conventional attack requires a public declaration, at least when the doctrine's holder has reason to believe that such a public announcement will prevent attack. Likewise, no strategy could be worse for conventional action intended to deny a nuclear option to the enemy than to adopt a doctrine of nuclear defense against a conventional attack. In these circumstances, it is safe to assume that the Israeli effort to postpone Arab acquisition of nuclear arms will mean a rejection of those revisions of the Israeli doctrine demanded by the nuclear hawks. Proponents of a dovish nuclear position are likely to think conventional Israeli military action designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is viable.

In any event, the threat of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is just one more factor contributing to the increasing reliance of security/military considerations on political ones. A doctrine of nuclear defense against conventional attack, like a preventive strike against Arab acquisition of a nuclear capability, raises problems for the international legitimacy of Israeli actions and the potential influence of those actions on the positions the world powers take regarding the nuclear armament of the Arab states. Even the possibility of a stable mutual nuclear deterrence, in the event that the Arabs attain a
nuclear option despite Israel's efforts, depends on whether the two sides in the conflict develop political channels of communication between themselves, either directly or through a third party. These circumstances limit the time Israel has available to create the proper political conditions for either preventing the Arabs from attaining a nuclear capability or, at least, for creating a stable deterrence.

The level of risk associated with nuclear proliferation in the Middle East requires a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict before the Arabs obtain their own nuclear capability. In any event, Israel's present advantage in this strategic equation does not necessarily mean that time is on its side. This fact has political ramifications: we need only note the increasing weight of political considerations in the Israeli concept of national security, particularly in regard to the dangers of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

Notes

1. This article was completed a few weeks before the author's untimely death. Final preparation for publication was thus undertaken by the editor.


3. This idea was given its most extreme expression by David Ben-Gurion: "The minister of defense is authorized to determine security policy while the role of the minister of foreign affairs is to explain that policy," Moshe Sharret, personal diary (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1978), p. 1117.

4. This concept was coined by Yitzhak Rabin in his lecture at a memorial evening for Yitzhak Sadeh in Tel Aviv, September 21, 1967.

5. See, for example, Moshe Dayan, "Military Activity During Peace Time," Ma'arachot (March 1959): 54-60.

6. See note 2 above.

7. "We will deny the Arabs any territorial successes, we will destroy their army as much as is possible, and will improve the ceasefire lines. By so doing we will prove to the Arabs for the second time that they are unable to achieve their aim through a military option." From Tal, "Israel's Doctrine": 53.


12. The term "secure borders" or "defensible borders" was first expressed several weeks after the end of the Six Day War by three ministers in the government: Yigal Allon, Moshe Carmel, and Moshe Dayan. See Ha'rezet, Sept. 5, 1967.


17. For instance, the combination of superior weapons, technology, and trained personnel was responsible for the destruction of Syrian missile batteries in the Lebanese Bek'a Valley during the Lebanon War, as was the use of the Merkava tank and attack helicopters.


19. On the nuclear issue see David Ben-Gurion, As Israel Fought, pp. 39-44.


24. Dayan, "Military Activities During Peace Time."


29. This consideration played an important role in the assumptions of the General Staff on the eve of the Six Day War. See, for example, Matityahu Peled, Ma'ariv, (May 16, 1969); also Horowitz, "The Israeli Concept": 11-12.

30. Egypt was also aware of the importance of an additional factor in the IDF's power of deterrence. This was expressed by Hasin Haichal (then editor of Al
Aram): "Israel cannot remain apathetic about what has happened, this is not a question of Egyptian control of the Tiran, but of something greater. All of Israel's defense philosophy is on trial now... Israel will be forced to take military action."

Al Aram (May 26, 1967). See also Peled, Maariv.

31. See also Aharon Yariv, "Strategic Depth," Jerusalem Quarterly (no. 17, Fall 1980): 3-12.


34. Avraham Adan, On Both Banks of the Suez. (Jerusalem: Edanim, 1979), Chapters 2 and 4. See also Bartov, Dodo 2.


36. See Yair Evron and Dan Horowitz, "The Future of the Israeli-Arab Conflict," The Jerusalem Group for National Planning (Jerusalem: Van Leer Institute, Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, 1974-1975), no. 5. The study made by the Jerusalem Group was the first to propose the idea of demilitarized zones in the framework of future arrangements between Israel and the Arab states, as a substitute for deploying the Israeli army in the Sinai. The idea was later developed and adapted by strategic planners in the planning section of the IDF under the command of Avraham Tamir. See also M. Kerem, Criteria for the Evaluation of Security Borders (Tel Aviv University); Aharon Klieman, International Guarantees and Secure Boundaries (Tel Aviv University); Arieh Shelav, Security Arrangements in the Sinai Peninsula in the Framework of the Peace Arrangements with Egypt (Study by the Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, no. 3, October 1978).


38. See Dayan's remark, Maariv (May 30, 1975); also Horowitz, "The Israeli Concept": 27-29.

39. See the decision of the Labor Party Convention (March 1981).


41. Dayan, Avnei Derekh, pp. 391-417. See also Bartov, Dodo 1: 126-130.


44. See, for instance, Sharon's remarks on the importance of the West Bank for Israel's existence, Maariv (May 19, 1981). See the protocol from the seminar on "Secure Border." (Participants: Abba Eban, Moshe Arens, Yehuda Ben Meir, and Amnon Rubenstein, at the Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University.)

45. Allon, "The Case for Secure Boundaries."
allocated 6.6 percent of the budget in 1954; in 1963 this figure was 10.8 percent; in 1972, 19.4 percent; and in 1979 it was 25.5 percent. At the same time, this comprised 10 percent of the GNP between the years 1955 and 1963 and between the years 1964 and 1972 this was 8.5 percent; from 1973 it was 3.3 percent.


64. Tal, "Israel's Doctrine": 46.


67. Interview with Major-General Raphael Eitan (interviewer: Y. Erez), *Ma'ariv* (July 2, 1982); Order of the Day of the General Staff (June 4, 1982); Y. Erez, "Rafael Shel Hachayalim," interview with Major-General Eitan, *Ma'ariv* (June 2, 1982); Ze’ev Schiff, "The Goals of the War Changed," *Ha'aretz* (June 11, 1982). See the remarks of Arik Sharon for the Israeli television program "Moked" (June 16, 1982); Yediot Achronot (June 17, 1982); interview in *Ma'ariv*, (interviewer: Dov Goldstein) (June 18, 1982); Uzi Benziman, "The Legend of the Knife in the Back," *Ha'aretz* (June 23, 1982); Order of the Day of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff (June 14, 1982); Sharon’s remarks at the Israel Prize ceremonies, *Ha'aretz* (June 22, 1982).

68. Begin’s lecture before students at the National Security College "Milchama Bli Breira u’Milchama im Breira," *Yediot Achronot* (August 20, 1982). In this context see the interview with the Commander of the Northern Region Amir Dori in *Ma'ariv* (July 30, 1982). Among other things Dori said, “One of the accomplishments of the Lebanese War was that it postponed, and perhaps completely avoided, a future war with the Syrians that could have been even more terrible than the Yom Kippur War.”

69. In an interview with Minister of Energy Yitzhak Berman on the eve of his departure from the government, precipitated by the massacre in Beirut, he said, "Two of the four primary moves in the Lebanese War did not receive government authorization. But scores of military steps which required no authorization were brought before us for authorization.” Also: “One of the main reasons that I put off resigning until now was my fear that the war would be extended north of Beirut and into eastern Lebanon. There seems to almost be an obligation to execute those moves. The minister of defense coined the slogan which has since been repeated many times over: ‘The terrorists and the Syrians must be completely driven out of Lebanon.’ Several days ago the minister of defense even confirmed for me that his slogan includes Tripoli and the Beka’a Valley.” *Yediot Achronot* (Sept. 24, 1982). On the same subject see: Y. Erez, "The Minister Bypasses the Chief of Staff," *Ma’ariv* (Sept. 24, 1982).


71. In this context it is possible to understand the Labor governments’ refusal to recognize a Pales tinean entity.


73. See, for instance: Shimon Peres, David’s Sling (Jerusalem: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), pp. 150, 156–158; Moshe Dayan, Sinai Campaign Diary (Tel Aviv: Am Haaser, 1965), pp. 14–17; and Ben-Gurion’s letter to Dayan at the end of the latter’s service as chief of staff in Dayan, Avnei Derekh, p. 375.

74. This formulation is Yigal Allon’s, writing in the *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review* (Dec. 24, 1965). See also the interview with Shimon Peres in *Ma’ariv* (Sept. 26, 1980).


76. Avigdor Hazelkorn, "Israel: From an Option to a Bomb in the Basement,” in R.M. Lawrence and J. Larus, eds., *Nuclear Proliferation Phase Two* (Lawrence, Manhattan, and Wichita: University of Kansas, 1976), pp. 149–182. Shlomo Aron son arrived at a conclusion similar to Hazeldorn’s, saying that between the years 1968 and 1970 Israel developed its nuclear option to a point where it could be considered to have been realized. See Shlomo Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining*; also see Dayan’s speech as it was reported in *Ha’aretz* (March 15, 1976).

77. Shlomo Gazit, former head of Israeli military intelligence, in a lecture at Tel Aviv University, noted that one of Sadat’s reasons for deciding to come to Jerusalem was his estimation of Israeli nuclear capabilities, *Yediot Achronot* (Nov. 2, 1978).


80. Interview with Sharon in *Yediot Achronot* (June 12, 1981); and interview with Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan in *Ma’ariv* (June 11, 1981).